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INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY: SUMMARY
WITHOUT COMMENT
CURTIS WRIGHT, JRt
"Let me have the facts in alphabetical order," said a learnedjudge in bitter jest to a counsel who was floundering hopelessly
in the midst of a mass of dates; and every one who has attended
the law courts [of London] must have witnessed judicial be-
wilderment quite as painful, if less emphatically and sarcastically
expressed.,
The judges of this country likewise express themselves--although
seldom from the bench-to the effect that counsel do not always dis-
play an ability to array the facts of a cause in understandable fashion.2
It follows quite naturally that juries are frequently unable to under-
stand the facts of the cases in which they are asked to give their
verdict.3 Considering the task insuperable for an unaided jury, the
English judge felt he failed in a duty if he did not himself assist the
jury by his "summing-up.'"
The English summing-up practice, however, is largely foreign to
American law, since the former is understood to encompass, as a
matter of course, the opinion of the judge.5 Our American notion
seems to be that so long as he stops somewhere short of the hanging
charge (advocacy for the Crown in a capital case) or mere veiled
direction of the jury, the English judge does not err if he gives the
jury the benefit of his advice on such matters as the adequacy of the
proof and the credibility of the witnesses6 In this country, the trial
courts of the United States, and those of some dozen of the states,
t Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law.
1. "Lex," The Late Mr. Baron Huddleston, 5 GREN BAG 105, 106 (1893).
2. E.g., a new supreme court rule of New Jersey will require candidates for the
counsellor's examination to have taken a thirty week course in oral advocacy
and brief writing. R.R. 1:21-1 (c), [adopted] Sept. 9, 1953; to be effective Sept.
1, 1954-at which time it replaces former rule 1:8-9. This rule is said to have
been caused by the bench's discouragement with the inadequacy of the bar's
presentation of cases.
3. "Flemington [N.J.]-Superior Court Judge Henry Schenk today dismissed
a jury hearing a suit against a Trenton construction firm .... At 4 P.M. Judge
Schenk halted the proceedings and asked the jury members how many of them
could honestly say they understood all of Zuegner's figures.. .. Only seven of thejurors raised their hands.... Judge Schenk, after a conference with attorneys
for both sides, then decided to hear the case alone. The trial jury was dismissed
." Trenton [N.J.] Times, Dec. 17, 1953.
4. And in Devlin v. Kilcrease, 2 McMullan 425, 428 (S.C. 1842), Richardson, J.,
seconded Lord Brougham's encomiums of Lord Ellenborough's practices of "help-
ing" juries.
5. E.o, KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 753, p. 507 (16th ed. 1952).
Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MicH. L. REv. 302, 305(1915). Or see the charge in any volume of the NOTABLE BruTisH TRIALs SERIES.
6. But see Clouston & Co., Ltd. v. Corry [1906] 46 A.C. 122, 130 (P.C.), and
Markadonis v. The King [1935] 3 D.L.R. 424 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
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are said to follow a common law system which permits judicial com-
ment.7 That there is a difference between the English and the
American versions of this system was colorfully expressed by an
elder statesman of the Vermont bar upon his return from an inspec-
tion of the English courts:
What impressed me, in the jury cases that I heard while I was
over there, was that the judge on the bench.., sat there to give
the jury the benefit of his learning, and to help them weigh the
evidence. Our law is that the Court has a right to do that pro-
vided the Court is careful to make it clear to the jury that they
are not obliged to go that way, and make it clear to them that
they are the sole judges of the disputed question; but he would
stampede a carload of frozen beef if he exercised that right .... 8
A less aggressive function was sometimes undertaken by English
judges, being that of mere summarization as opposed to the complete
summing up; this was the "summary without comment" of American
law.9 An English view of that modified practice is:
According to the old legal tradition which Charles Dickens cari-
catured in the person of Mr. Justice Stareleigh, the judge presid-
ing at a trial had simply to present to the jury a clear but
perfectly colorless summary of the evidence.10
This colorless summary system has been called a "weak-hearted
compromise" by Dean Wigmore." It is nevertheless, in the theory and
the letter of the law, the assertedly permitted practice in perhaps
seventeen states.12 However, in a number of states, as mentioned, the
unrestricted common law system prevails. Taking the latter group
as a conservative minimum of ten for the moment, it would by this
calculation appear that in some twenty-seven of the states (a clear
majority) the jury is entitled to a summing-up -be it the mere
"colorless review" or something less pallid. That in fact something
considerably short thereof is the practice in a rather large number
of those states is sought to be shown on the accompanying map. 3
That map must be explained, however, lest it be utterly misleading.
The factors leading to the writer's conclusions that many of those
7. 9 WIGMORE, EvIENrac § 2551 (3d ed. 1940).
S. Redmond, Over There, 20 VT. ST. B.A. 174, 188 (1927). Yet Vermont has no
statutory limitation and permits the common law charge. Wilson v. Dyer, 116 Vt.
342, 75 A.2d 677 (1950); State v. lMalnati, 109 Vt. 429, 433, 199 At]. 249, 251(1938); Foss v. Sherwood, 104 Vt. 141, 147-148, 157 Atl. 834, 836 (1932); Sawyer
v. Phaley, 33 Vt. 69, 73 (1860); Yale v. Seely, 15 Vt. 221, 236 (1843). But see
18 MINN. L. REv. 441, 445, n.20 (1934).
9. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS oF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 227 (Pub-
lished bv The Law Center of New York University for The National Conference
of Judicial Council, 1949).
10. "Lex", The Late Mr. Baron Huddleston, 5 GREEN BAG 105, 106 (1893).
The reference, of course, is to Bardell v. Pickwick in DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS
c. 34.
11. 9 WIGMORE, EvDENCE § 2551 n.3 (3d ed. 1940).
12. VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 227-228.
13. P. 207 infra.
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states are restricted-in-fact are various, and rest largely in opinion.
Any attempt at sensible explanation requires state-by-state discussion.
For the time being, therefore, it is simply mentioned that the merits
or demerits of the "mere colorless summary" are hardly a profitable
subject of discussion if it be true, as this paper contends, that in
truth the instruction process of an overwhelming majority of the
states stops very considerably short thereof.
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
The foregoing caption has two connotations. It is of course the
name given to a set of resolutions adopted by the American Bar
Association stating approved practices as to a variety of phases of
procedure and its regulation ;" one of these deals particularly with
minimum trial standards.'- It is also the title of the monumental
volume in which those standards are explained, and in which the
extent of compliance therewith in the forty-eight states is illustrated.0
The latter's maps, of which there are dozens, represent the data
available at the time of its compilation as to different phases of prac-
tice.,7 The work was not represented as being terminal and definitive,
but rather as a point of reference to which more detailed state studies
would be directed. Many such state commentaries have appeared
since the publication of that volume, and it is hoped that the present
paper may in some degree be useful in that same direction. ' s Super-
ficially, however, it might seem that the present map included herein
contradicts the findings displayed by certain of the maps in Minimum
Standards of Judicial Administration.0 It must therefore promptly
be explained that the map printed here represents a synthesis of three
of the maps in the above mentioned work, takes into account other
factors described but not illustrated in that volume, and also considers
certain later information and changes of law.
The minimum standard to which this paper is directed is part of
one of the trial practice standards. In a recent article the writer
recapitulated the movement for reform in judicial administration
centering about that entire trial standard.2 0 He was forced to the
conclusion that in respect to its declared chief goal, the "restoration
14. Report of the Committee on Trial Practice, 63 A.B.A. REP. 551, 553(adopted July, 1938).
15. See Recommendation 2, VANDERBILT, op. clt. supra note 9, and text at note21 in! rq.
16. VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 9.
17. Id. at 220-234.
18. Throughout the present paper there are references to state reports on
degrees of local compliance with the American Bar Association's minimum trial
standards, e.g., Wyoming, Nebraska, Iowa and Wisconsin.
19. VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 9.
20. Wright, The Invasion of Jury: Temperature of the War, 27 TEMP. L.Q.
137 (1953).
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of the trial judge's common law powers," progress had lately been
somewhat less than rapid. But that latter question, involving the
controversial subject of judicial "comment," is excluded so far as
possible (which is not very far) from the present inquiry. This paper
seeks rather to dispose of the following question: apart from comment,
what is the general state of compliance with the recommended trial
standard? It seeks to focus on the summary without comment; and
more precisely, on the extent to which the summary is actually used.
It is thus for present purposes as though the American Bar Associ-
ation's Trial Standard No. 2 had been amended by deletion of the
words bracketed in the following version:
That after the evidence has been closed and counsel have con-
cluded their arguments to the jury, the trial judge should instruct
the jury orally as to the law of the case, and should have power
to advise them as to the facts by summarizing and analyzing the
evidence [and commenting upon the evidence or upon any part
of it], always leaving the final decision on questions of fact to
the jury.21
Turning now to the twenty-seven states in which the court nomi-
nally has at least the power to give the impartial summary which
the standard as hypothetically amended contemplates, it is acknowl-
edged that in many he instructs neither orally nor after counsel have
concluded argument to the jury, both of which practices, of course,
are in contravention of the recommended Trial Standard. Yet any
comprehensive appraisal must take into consideration the factors
of actual practice. It must also consider whether responsibility for
preparing the charge is primarily that of the court or of counsel, must
decide what is meant by the term "orally," and must examine the
relative strictness with which the prohibitions on comment in the
Intermediate states22 are enforced. When appraised in all those con-
nections, the summary "power" will in most cases be found to repre-
sent considerably less than even the "mere colorless summary" which
the English writer deplored.
THE MISSOURI POSITION
By the foregoing definition, the Missouri instructing process is not
that of the type under discussion here. For instance (looking at its
elements somewhat in the order of the factors mentioned in th4 Trial
Standard No. 2, supr 23) it is never asserted that the Missouri judge
charges orally, for in fact he is not expected to "charge." He is re-
quired to instruct in both civil and criminal cases.24 The instructions
21. VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 221.
22. See the map p. 207 infria which shows the Intermediate states.
23. See text at note 21 supra.
24. Criminal cases: No. REv. STAT., SUl. CT. RULES § 26.02 and § 26.09 (Supp.
1951). Civil cases: Non-direction raises a prima facie presumption of error; it con-
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are in writing in the strict sense of being written out beforehand and
read verbatim.2 Certainly instructions (whether general or special)
originating with the court rather than counsel are not contemplated
to any great extent. The practice, rare elsewhere, of the reading of
instructions by counsel rather than by the court persists in some
circuits.2c As to the order of trial whereby arguments follow the in-
structions, it is taken to be so settled that it is occasionally called the
"Missouri order" hereafter for convenience. 27
As to the matter of comment on the evidence, there is an elaborate
discussion of the origins of its ban in Missouri in the predecessor of
this present quarterly. - Its author, an advocate of the "common law
comment," was unable to concede that there was any real statutory
bottom for the rule that there be no comment on the civil side.29 Even
he was nevertheless forced to admit that stare decisis had removed
whatever clouds there might be in the legislative chain of title.30 That
same analyst found the decisions of the preceding half century to
reveal few instances of deliberate comment. There was a plethora,
however, on instructions in the nature of comment, i.e., instructions
which singled out evidence, assumed facts, and the like.31 If that
situation has changed, the cases do not readily so indicate. 2
There is more recent literature which indicates that the Missouri
bench and bar doubts that the instructing process is even passably
satisfactory.,- It is equally clear that there is no widespread sentiment
that improvement in Missouri could be secured by changes in the
direction of the quoted Trial Standard2 4 It is not the place of this
stitutes reversible error if the facts are so complicated as to warrant an instruc-
tion and if prejudice results to a party. Yerger v. Smith, 338 Mo. 140, 89 S.W.2d
66 (1935); Arnold v. May Department Stores, 337 Mo. 727, 739, 85 S.W.2d 748,
755 (1935) ; Sherman Investment Co. v. Sheehan, 199 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Mo. App.
1947); see Dorman v. East St. Louis Ry., 335 Mo. 1082, 75 S.W.2d 854 (1934).
25. Ibid. Cf., Stone, Instructions to Juries: A Survey of the General Field,
26 WAsH. U.L.Q. 455 (1941) as to what "written" may mean elsewhere.
26. The late Judge Merrill E. Otis colorfully describes this practice in The
Judge to the Jury, 6 Y4,N. CITY L. Rsv. 3, 4-6 (1937).
27. Mo. REv. STAT., SUP. CT. RULEs, § 26.02 (Supp. 1951).
28. Rosenwald, The Right of Judicial Comment on the Evidence in Missouri,
14 ST. LoUIS L. Rsv. 221 (1929).
29. Mo. Laws 1838-39, p. 27, was similar to Mo. RFv. STAT. § 546.380 (1949),
but was not in terms confined to criminal cases. It was constructively repealed in
Mo. Rav. STAT. p. 499 4§ 19 and 20 (1845). See Hogel v. Lindell, 10 Mo. 483, 487(1847). But Mo. Laws 1830-31, pp. 33-34, from which Mo. Rrv. STAT. § 546.380(1949), was derived without any substantial change, was unaffected.
30. Rosenwald, supra note 28, at 248.
11. Id. at 234, n.35 alone citing over 60 such cases.
32. E.g., see objections raised in Stephens v. Kansas City Gas Co., 354 Mo. 835,
851, 191 S.W.2d 601, 608 (1946); Teel v. May Department Stores Co., 352 Mo.
127, 140, 176 S.W.2d 440, 448 (1943).
33. Hulen, "Twelve Good Men and True": The Forgotten Men of the Court-
room, 38 A.B.A.J. 813 (Oct. 1952).
34. See text at note 21 supra. Missouri Proposed Code of Evidence § 1.08,
p. 12 (1948): "The court shall not ... sum up the evidence or comment to thejury . .. "
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paper to take a hand in that controversy. The effort here is directed
toward appraisal of the systems of the so-called Intermediate states.
It is interesting to note that on the whole the practices of that group
are not quite so divergent from those of Missouri as might be
expected2Y
CLASSIFICATIONS OF STATES
The lumping together of all the rest of the states, other than the
Intermediate and Common Law groups, is made solely for simpli-
fication and in order to target this discussion. It is not intended to
imply that their practices are uniform. This remaining so-called
Restricted group is taken as totalling twenty-one, including Missouri3 a
Apart from a handful which are discussed in the predecessor article,17
all are accepted 38 (to the extent that citation is unnecessary) as for-
bidding even an impartial reiteration or marshalling of that which
has been admitted in evidence.
There is likewise agreement as to membership of the central core,
at least, of the Unrestricted group as shown on the accompanying map
(white areas); and two of these, Vermont and Rhode Island, are
discussed herein.3 9 The later discussions will show (toward the end
of Group IV, inffra) why Maine, Maryland and Massachusetts are
shown unrestricted to make a final total on the map of thirteen
Common Law states."
The states in between those two extremes are discussed separately
hereafter. That examination of the functioning of the anomalous
summary without comment system serves to show the interrelation
of the complex of elements which determines the character of a state's
instructing process. The order of discussion is designed to show the
drift and trend of the two main American patterns. Similarities,
apart from the one main line of cleavage, may be seen to overshadow
the superficial differences.
The analysis seeks, without being too grimly categorical, to work
35. The foregoing Missouri section has been read critically by Benjamin F.
Boyer of the Missouri Bar, Dean of the Temple University School of Law, to
whom the writer extends thanks for valuable suggestions.
36. See the map p. 207 inf ra. The states as shown are: Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia.
37. Members of this group, discussed in Wright, supra note 20, include Colo-
rado, p. 151; Illinois, p. 153; South Carolina, p. 159; South Dakota, p. 155; and
Virginia, references at p. 141, n.27 and p. 155, n.98.
38. Herein these references to "acceptance" refer to sources such as VANDE-
BILT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 227 and 228. The large literature of this subject is
collected in Wright, supra note 20, at 138-142.
39. California, Connecticut, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. (As to California,
Michigan, and New Mexico, see Wright, sura note 20, at 145, 143, and 147 re-
spectively.).
40. See the latter part of Group IV, infra.
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along somewhat adverbial lines. The main Intermediate (or theoreti-
cally Intermediate) class is divided into groups having a certain
homogeneity. As to the individual members of the groups, the break-
down centers about those handymen, How, When, Who, What, Why.
How (for instance) are the instructions prepared and given (written
or oral)? When are they to be given (before or after argument)?
Who is responsible for authorship (court or counsel) ? What are they
to include (law or fact-and-law) ? And generally, Why is the situation
handled in this manner? The main groups are:
Group I: Wyoming, Nevada, Kansas, Nebraska and Utah (exclusively
written; precede argument).
Group II: Iowa, Ohio, Georgia and North Carolina (strict).
Group III: Delaware, Alabama and Tennessee (oral charges, but
issues only are reviewed).
Group IV: Wisconsin and Minnesota-grading off into three substan-
tially unrestricted states: Maryland, Massachusetts and Maine.
GROUP I: WYOMING, NEVADA, KANSAS, NEBRASKA AND UTAH
This group is homogeneous as to the When and How of the charge.
In all except Nebraska the instructions precede final arguments-
Missouri style. This order is found in no other state in the three
later groups except Maryland, but prevails in the majority of the
wholly restricted states which are not now under consideration. 41 It
is contrary to the recommended trial standards, but has arguments in
its favor-the best of which are aligned in one of the older federal
cases.' It may be conceded to be a restriction on the trial judge, at
any rate. When the jury retires with the words of counsel ringing
in its ears,-" any final review of the evidence would or will necessarily
be blunted. Since that recapitulation is not used in these states,
however, the question is academic.
The entire systems of these states are built around the strictly
written charge-although waiver is not unknown.44 But it is neces-
sary to consider just what is meant by written instrutions, since with
but one exception (known to the writer, at least) -that of Maryland
prior to 1941-instructions are conveyed to the jury vocally every-
where. The word written in this context, however, simply means read
41. VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 232 (map).
42. United States v. Foster, 183 Fed. 626, 628 (W.D. Va. 1910).
43. Otis, supra note 26, at 3-6.
44. Pierson, Instructions and Argument to the Jury: The Defense Point of
View, 39 A.B.A.J. 877 (Oct. 1953), states:
The trial judge was one of the old school of unconventional [Oklahoma]judges. He insisted on instructing the jury orally. He made a point of ask-
ing counsel in the presence of the jury if they would agree to oral instruc-
tions.
Id. at 877.
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aloud verbatim from writings prepared in advance. That requirement
of course is common almost everywhere as to the requests by counsel
for special instructions. The oral charge, however, is contemplated
as being the general charge of the court, delivered in what might be
termed free-style-as opposed to the instant procedure.45 Even under
the oral instruction plan, where the trial judge is often encouraged
to organize his charge by writing it out in advance,4 the plan expects
that the charge's delivery shall be a process of speaking directly to
the captive audience of twelve, with whatever repetition and emphasis
the speaker finds to be needed for the adequate communication of
thought.Y4 Whether it includes a review of the evidence or not makes
it no more nor less oral by this definition. And statutes requiring
charges to be written unless a reporter is present and takes down the
charge are not "written instructions" statutes for the present pur-
poses, and will not be given much special attention hereafter. 8
The foregoing distinction between written and oral instructions is
one largely derived from the literature associated with the American
Bar Association's Trial Standards, and may not be universally ac-
cepted. It will at least serve to indicate the sense in which the terms
are here to be used.
All this discussion of terminology has a certain unrealistic tinge
with reference to this Group I framework. The underlying pre-
conception of the instructing process here is largely in opposition to
the concept of there being any substantial general charge by the court.
Those habits of mind are illustrated by the example of what happened
to some experimental legislation in Illinois in 1933 to 1935 which
attempted to engraft, upon a written instructions plan, a scheme
whereby the court prepared a charge based on suggestions of counsel.
It lasted only until the next legislature met.4V 9 The proposition is
spotlighted in the Nebraska discussion which follows later in this
group. Meanwhile, one might also consider, under the Missouri order
of trial and the strict-written plan, just how - mechanically and
physically-there could be any full summary of the evidence. Such
45. The designation free style in this connection is the writer's own. It will
be seen to mean the truly oral charge discussed in the sentences immediately
following. It may be ad libitum or may be read directly from the judge's pre-
pared statement.
46. Or, as Judge Stone said:
[T]he trial judge who reduces his instructions to writing, a process con-
ducive to care, is in the long run more apt to escape reversal than the one
who does not resort to that labor before charging the jury.
Stone, Instructions to Juries: A Suroey of the General Field, 26 WASH. U.L.Q.
455, 462 (1941).
47. Chesnut, Instructions to the Jury, 3 F.R.D. 113 (1942).
48. Seen in Georgia, Tennessee, Minnesota infra.
49. Ill. Laws 1933, Art. 7, § 67, p. 784, known as § 67 Illinois Civil Practice
Act of 1933; revised Ill. Laws 1935, § 1, p. 1071. See IIL. ANN. STAT. c. 110,
§ 191, p. 346 (1948) for present form and Historical and Practice Notes.
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would have to be prepared in the interim between the close of the
evidence and the reading of the instructions. Counsel would expect to
see and note exceptions to the final draft and, to say the least, con-
siderable time might elapse before the court could reduce to a satisfac-
tory written form the summary based on the court's notes and,
perhaps, a reporter's transcript of the testimony.
Wyoming
Although Wyoming adopted the Ohio Code in its entirety,50 it does
not generally follow the Ohio practice of a two-stage instruction. The
only Wyoming instructions are the written ones which precede argu-
ment.1 The court's responsibility is not heavy, but it is probably no
longer the law that ".... mere non-direction, partial or total, is not
ground for a new trial, unless specific instructions, good in point of
law and appropriate to the evidence, were requested and refused."52
In felony cases, at least, it may be error to fail to state the basic law
applicable, regardless of request, and the same may be said in civil
cases as to statement of the main issues.5
The cases, seemingly without exception, exhibit the familiar Mis-
souri and Illinois style of separately numbered, written instructions--
given or refused.34 The cases do not reveal recapitulations of the
evidence, and the only way the question of summary arises is in
connection with the occasional reference to sufficiency of delineation
of the issues. It also arises, indirectly, in connection with objec-
tions that instructions referring to evidence were in the nature of
comment.
Some cases reveal the practice of letting the pleadings go to the
jury-which practice the supreme court has countenanced and ac-
cepted as a means of instructing as to the issues. G Needless to say,
50. Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 3-2408 (1945), q.v., for annotations entitled
Decision Under Law of Origin citing the corresponding sections of Page's Ohio
Code.
51. Wyo. Co,,up. STAT. ANN. § 3-2408 (1945), which is substantially unchanged
since the original territorial act of 1886. The statute does not in terms prohibit
summary.
52. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS I ACTIONS CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL i4 2341 (2d ed. 1912). This language was disapproved in Union Pacific
Ry. v. Jarvi, 3 Wyo. 375, 381, 23 Pac. 398, 400 (1890), and was approved in
Hay v. Peterson, 6 Wyo. 419, 441, 45 Pac. 1073, 1079 (1896).
53. Gardner v. State, 27 Wyo. 316, 329, 196 Pac. 750, 754 (1921) (statement
of the law); cf. Harris v. State, 34 Wyo. 175, 188, 242 Pac. 411, 415 (1926);
Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo. 233, 249, 88 Pac. 221, 224 (1907) (statement of the
issues).
54. Barber v. Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, 53 Wyo. 65, 78 P.2d 1101(1938) ; Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo. 233, 249, 88 Pac. 221, 224 (1907).
55. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Arbogast, 53 Wyo. 275, 296, 81 P.2d 885, 893(1938); Wallace v. Skinner, supra note 54. But see WYo. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-2412 as partial authorization for summarization of testimony.
56. "There seems to be no provision of the statutes either permitting or pro-
hibiting such a practice, though we believe it is quite common in this state."
Wallace v. Skinner, 15 'Wyo. 233, 250, 88 Pac. 221, 224 (1907).
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this practice (reversible error in some jurisdictions) 5 is discoun-
tenanced by the more progressive element of the Wyoming bench
and bar58
Nevada
At fast, some of the pioneer appellate judges bucked like western
steers at the restriction of the 1864 constitution which provided that
"Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but may
state the testimony and declare the law."519 Their successors, however,
were more docile-and it is significant that no recent cases involving
summations are found. Yet a 1903 case, after affirming the refusal
of instructions which recited certain testimony too graphically, added:
This does not interfere with the right of the court during the trial
to state the testimony or what a witness said, without assuming
whether it is true .... c,
Then, later cases show increasing strictness to the effect that what-
ever the court says must be exclusively in the form of a written
instruction.62 About the only mention of the evidence comes in prof-
ferred instructions, which may be refused if their statement of the
evidence is incomplete3 Nevada adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1952, but no change in the instant phases of instructing
is necessarily involved."
Kansas
Th& Kansas Code provides very complete blueprints as to instruc-
tions.6 General instructions are provided for in addition to those
specially requested, but are to be in writing, of course, and
Before reading the instructions to the jury, the court shall, when
requested, submit the same to counsel on either side and give
counsel a reasonable time to suggest modifications thereof. 0
57. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Anderson, 134 Tenn. 666, 185
S.W. 677 (1915).
58. This view is taken by Frank J. Trelease, Professor of Law, University of
Wyoming, and member of the Advisory Committee to the Wyoming Supreme Court
on Rules of Procedure, whose kindness in reading the foregoing section is grate-
fully acknowledged.
59. NEv. CONST. Art. VI, §12 (1864). State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 409 (1867):
This language is contained in many of the newly adopted State Constitu-
tions.... (W]here these peculiar expressions originated, we have been un-
able to find.
Id. at 447.
60. State v. Ah Tong, 7 Nev. 148, 152 (1871); State v. Robison, 54 Nev. 56, 61,
6 P.2d 433, 437 (1931).
61. State v. Buralli, 27 Nev. 41, 54, 71 Pac. 532, 536 (1903).
62. State v. Scott, 37 Nev. 412, 431, 142 Pac. 1053, 1058 (1914).
63. State v. Robison, 54 Nev. 56, 60, 6 P.2d 433, 437 (1931); NEv. COMP. LAWS
§ 8766 (1929).
64. Nav. R. Crv. P. 51 (adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court, effective Jan.
1, 1953; based on FED. R. Cr. P. 51, revised to provide for instructions to thejury before argument is made).
65. KAl. GEN. STAT. c. 60, §§ 60-2909 and 60-2913 (1949) (civil); KAN. Gs.
STAT. c. 62, §§ 62-1438 and 62-1447 (1949) (criminal).
66. KAN. Gazq. STAT. c. 60, § 60-2909 (1949).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss2/3
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY
It is thus clear that to give any real summary would involve consid-
erable delay. There is, however, a 1906 case which rather unexpect-
edly undertook a full discussion of this matter. The gist of this dis-
cussion is that:
The court should present the theories of the respective parties,
and in doing so may refer to the lines of evidence... carefully
refraining from expressing an opinion as to what the facts do
or do not prove .... 07
The foregoing case has not been overlooked in later opinions, and
has been cited as authority against some of the errors against which
it warned ("singling out evidence," "intimating opinion," etc.) but
rarely to uphold anything remotely approaching summation.1 In-
cidentally, it is no rash assumption to say that paucity of cases on
summation is virtual proof that there is no custom of reviewing
evidence in any given jurisdiction. It is an invariable rule that in
any state system contemplating full recapitulation of the evidence and
simultaneously forbidding comment, there is a lush blossoming of
cases urging that the reviews in fact slipped over into comment.6
The absence of such cases in this entire Group I is cogent (if negative)
evidence that the practice does not exist.
Nebraska
In a local report on compliance with the American Bar Association's
Minimum Trial Standards, it was dryly noted that:
In Nebraska there is no statutory prohibition, but the general use
of written instructions makes a full summary of the evidence, as
opposed to a delineation of the issues, very unlikely.
70
That the abstinence from any extended review is not inadvertent or
accidental, however, is demonstrated by the modification of Federal
Rule 51 at the time when Nebraska almost secured civil procedure
67. Haines -. Goodlander, 73 Kan. 183, 190, 84 Pac. 986, 988 (1906).
68. Pool v. Day, 143 Kan. 226, 234, 53 P.2d 912, 917 (1936) ; Wyrick v. Parsons
Ry. & Light Co., 100 Kan. 122, 126, 163 Pac. 1059, 1060 (1917); Wichman v.
Kansas City, Mexico and Orient Ry., 84 Kan. 339, 342, 114 Pac. 212, 213 (1911).
69. The leading Kansas case on summarizing, Haines v. Goodlander, 73 Kan.
183, 84 Pac. 986 (1906), has been cited in Kansas only in the cases mentioned
in note 68 supra. In North Carolina, a typical case, Withers v. Lane, 144 N.C. 184,
56 S.E. 855 (1907), has been cited on this point some 39 times. In Massachusetts,
a similar case, Whitney v. Wellesley & Boston Street Ry., 197 Mass. 495, 84 N.E. 95(1908), has been cited 38 times in connection with propriety of the summation.
70. Turner & Dow, Nebraska and the Minimum Standards of Judicial Adminis-frtto, 30 NEB. L. Rgv. 29, 35 (1951). Kindness of Edw. W. Morgan, Esq., of the
Nebraska Bar and member of the faculty of the University of Nebraska College of
Law in reading this Nebraska r6sum6 is gratefully acknowledged. He points out
that the duty of the court to instruct on all issues is enforced even in the absence
of appropriate request or specific objections of counsel to omissions at the time-
often permitting counsel to secure reversals after "lying doggo." The latter
problems, however, are deemed beyond the scope of this article. The same remark
applies to Mr. Morgan's mention of the wide use of standardized instructions, on
which latter subject see Standardized Irstructions to Juries Adopted by the
*tr ociation of District Judges of Nebraska, 24 NEn. L. Ruv. 195 (1945).
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rules based on the federal system.7'1 At any rate, the general scheme
ostensibly resembles that of Missouri, except that despite the some-
what ambiguous provision for additional instructions after argument,
in actual practice Nebraska judges always charge after arguments of
counsel.7 2 The attitude toward comment, at any stage of trial, is a
strict one.7 3 As to instructions referring to the evidence, and which
are alleged to be in the nature of comment, there is one mitigating
doctrine. Thanks in part to Roscoe Pound's influence on the supreme
bench, such error is reversible only if prejudicial.7 4
Utah
In literal terms of statutes and rules, Utah is no more liberal as to
instructions than the other members of this group.7 r In addition,
there is evidence that the committee on adoption of the Federal Rules
found the general sentiment of the bar opposed to any liberalization
of the instructing process.7 6 But in a 1943 case, one of the supreme
court justices had gone out of his way to stimulate the use of more
concrete instructions, concluding some rather extended remarks by
saying:
Where no piece of evidence is singled out and emphasized I see
no better way to instruct in reference to the evidence and in a
concrete manner on all theories of the case than to sum up the
salient bits of evidence for each party.77
Deference must be paid to that statement as well as the court's
repeated disparagement of abstract instructions,78 a recent affirmation
of the "... duty of the court to cover the theories of both parties in
71. The set of rules was submitted to the legislature in 1943 but the legislature
rejected them and repealed the rule-making enabling act. Ne. Sess. Laws 1939,
c. 30, 63 (1943); See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 50 (2d ed. 1947); VANDERBILT
op. cit. supra note 9, at 117. See objections of Judge Chas. B. Clark to the modified
version of FED. R. Cirv. P. 51, which was incorporated in the rules submitted to the
legislature, in Clark, The Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 NED. L. REV.
307, 319 (1942).
72. NEB. REV. STAT. S 25-1107 (esp. part 7) to § 25-1116 (1943) (civil); NED.
Rnv. STAT. § 29-2016 (1943) (criminal).
73. Kersenbrock v. Martin, 12 Neb. 374, 11 N.W. 462, 463 (1882) ; In re Estate
of Strelow, 117 Neb. 168, 220 N.W. 251 (1928), noted 7 NED. L. BULL. 379 (1929).
74. Stull v. Stull, 1 Neb. (unofficial) 380, 399, 96 N.W. 196, 203 (1901) (con-
curring opinion of Pound, C.). NEB. MLt. STAT. § 29-2308 (1943) provides that
harmless misdirection of the jury is not reversible error.
75. UTAH CODE ANN. § 104-24-14(4), § 105-32-1(5) (1943), which is now in
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 78, Rules (1953) (esp. Rule 51).
76. Although Utah adopted rules of civil procedure effective Jan. 1, 1950, very
similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the instructions rule No. 51,
was drastically modified to retain the former practice. See 24 IDAHO ST. B. A.
36 (1950).
77. Wolfe, C.J., concurring in State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 36, 137 P.2d 626,
632 (1943).
78. "We have repeatedly criticezd the giving of abstract statements of the law
to the jury...." State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 131, 170 P.2d 153, 162(1946).
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his instructions .. .,"I and the opinions of other writers5 -- for all of
which reasons Utah is shown with the Unrestricted-Intermediate
states on the map.
GROUP II: IOWA, OHIO, GEORGIA AND NORTH CAROLINA
All of this group follow the majority practice as to the When of
instructing. The requirements as to written instructions, apart from
those of Iowa, are considerably less stringent than those of Group I.
The pressure on the judge to prepare his own instructions begins to
be noticeable. While there are dissimilarities as to some of the minor
aspects, the members of this class have in common, in their appellate
decisions, an aggressive dislike of any remarks from the bench, at
any stage of trial, which border upon any intimation of opinion as to
the weight of the evidence or credibility of witnesses. Only in North
Carolina is there any real summary of the evidence.
Iowa
Iowa has one of the most specific rules as to the written instruction
ritual which has yet been seen.8' The written-and-read instructions
are mandatory, and counsel must see beforehand everything the court
intends to read-first in draft, then in final form. What was said as
to Nebraska has been stated several times by the Iowa courts, i.e.,
" .. under our practice it is not practicable or necessary for the court
to review the testimony of the witnesses.' 's2 It is unusual to find
reversals for mere summary, however, so long as references to the
evidence, amounting in fact to partial summary, are not so one-sided
as to amount to comment.8 3 The Iowa report on compliance with the
American Bar Association's Minimum Trial Standards, one notes,
flatly took the position that "Iowa does not permit the judge to sum
up the evidence, nor is he allowed to comment on it."'8
79. Startin v. Madsen, 237 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah 1951) (collecting cases);
Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 368, 279 Pac. 893, 896 (1929).
80. Some of these discrepancies are compared in MILLAR, CrVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERsPcTrvz 310, n.118 (1952).
81. IOWA CoDE ANN., Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 196 (1951). IOWACoDE ANN. c. 780 §§ 780.4, 780.9, 780.35 (1951) (criminal procedure-conforming
to the civil rules).
82. State v. Williams, 238 Iowa 838, 845, 28 N.W. 2d 514, 518 (1947); State
v. Proost, 225 Iowa 628, 636, 281 N.W. 167, 171 (1938) (cases cited).
83. "While the trend might conceivably indicate a virtual abolition of the
power of summary, the [Iowa] courts have not undertaken to spank the unruly
child, but seem content with verbal admonition [citing State v. Williams, supra
note 821." F. J. Silverman in an unpublished Iowa summary Prepared while a
senior student at Temple University School of Law in 1952-3. Aid received from
this and several other such careful summaries prepared by Mr. Silverman is
gratefully acknowledged.
84. Simmons & Pryor. Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, 36
IOWA L. REV. 436, 450 (1951), citing Russ v. War Eagle, 9 Iowa 374 (1859).
Those writers take the position that VANDERBILT, op. Cit. supra note 9, is in errorin stating at p. 229 and on the map at v. 227 that in Iowa a summary by the trial
iudge is compulsory. See also 19 IOWA L. Rnv. 603 (1934).
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Iowa has had considerable trouble with the instructing process in
the past. Prior to the adoption of the current rules it was said:
An examination of the North West Reporter discloses that more
cases were reversed by the Iowa Supreme Court on account of
errors in instructions than in any other state served by this
publication. 8
It appears that the situation in the latter respect is somewhat better
since the adoption of the new rules80 The general difficulty, however,
is not a new one to the Central West. That is, when upon a tradition
of wholly-written instructions there is imposed an attempt to give
the judge a fair share of responsibility for the charge, when his
discretion is simultaneously held to a minimum, and when there is
superimposed by the reviewing courts a solicitude for the effectiveness
of the instructions, a true dilemma is reached.8 7
Ohio
Ohio's bifurcated system is sui generis. It provides that the written,
special instructions requested by counsel precede the final arguments
- but the court's general oral charge comes after those closing
"speeches."88 The general picture resembles that of Iowa in that
judicial responsibility is greater than in the first group of states, yet
scrutiny of the charge is intense.8  While the code provisions are long-
standing and rather detailed, much of the restriction seems to have
come about through the cases.
The decisions do not require summary, neither do they forbid it,
according to an 1891 case.0 But in 1912 came the caveat: "[I] f an
attempt to review the evidence by the judge is made, it should be
scrupulously accurate as to matters of substance." 90 1
85. COOK, IOWA RUIES OF CML PROCEDURE § 196, p. 413 (1944).
86. "[G]reat strides were made with the adoption of the new Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1943, [but] there still remains much to be done." Simmons & Pryor,
supra note 84, at 437.
87. Iowa's statehood dates from 1846. Statutes confining instructions to the law
of the case, and forbidding alterations or modifications, appear as early as Iowa
Laws 1860 § 4785, and IOWA CODE § 1791 (1860). The duty to charge is enforced
in a long line of cases from Owen v. Owen, 22 Iowa 270 (1867), to Gardner v.
Johnson, 231 Iowa 1233, 3 N.W.2d 606 (1942). More could be said were it not for
the fact that the duty to charge is simply a different question from that at hand.
88. OHIo GEN. CODE; ANN. § 11420-1(5) (1940).
"The present law, which applies only to civil actions is a direct descendant of a
long series of related statutes which had their inception in the Code of Civil
Procedure in 1853." Shibley, Special Instructions on Law by Counsel Before
Argument, 11 OHI0 ST. L.J. 321 (1950).
89. Klass v. Klass, 27 Ohio App. 459, 465, 161 N.E. 406, 408 (1928) ; 39 OHIo
Jun. §§ 291 and 293; 1 REn, BRANSoN, INSTRucTioNs TO JuRIEs § 27 n.61 (2d ed.
1936). For the duty to charge, see Rhoades v. City of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 107,
105 N.E.2d 2 (1952), reversing, 100 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1951); 2 OHIo JuL.§ 744, p. 1390.
90. Morgan v. State, 48 Ohio St. 371, 377, 27 N.E. 710, 712 (1891).
91. American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, 86 Ohio St. 117, 123, 99 N.E. 89,
90 (1912).
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Meanwhile there had been the rather famous case suggesting that
the judge should not tip the delicate balance of the scales of justice
by so much as a wink or a look-and the present pattern of stringency
seemed established.92 It has carried over into some nice illustrations
of the "special pleading" of the written instructions on the law (curi-
ously reminiscent of the older Maryland system of "prayers"),933 but
more pertinent here are the remarks of Judge Newcomer:
A part of the judicial power which has come down with the
common law, being a part of the common law at the time of the
adoption of the constitution, is the right of the trial judge to
assist the jury in arriving at the facts, but finally to submit the
issues to the jury for its determination. Ohio is one of the states
that by the action of the [revising] courts does not use this
power .... These . . . are precedents growing out of a pioneer
situation... when the judges frequently were not lawyers. They
are precedents suited to the court of a justice of the peace. We
hope in Ohio we are at least by that stage in our civilization. 94
Georgia
The relative functions of court and jury have been changing gradu-
ally as one moves through this series, but the departure becomes more
clear as one turns to Georgia. There, a request to charge may be made
at any time before the jury retires to consider its verdict.9  As to
written instructions, since 1943 it has been sufficient that there be a
shorthand reporting of the charge.91 Counsel are not entitled to see
any instructions of the court, or even of opposing counsel, before the
same are actually charged to the jury.97 The system is thus designed
to place the responsibility for instructions largely upon the shoulders
of the court.1
In charging, however, the judge must drive through the strait gate
of the Georgia Dumb Act of 18509--so called because it was said to
92. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Howle, 68 Ohio St. 614, 622, 68 N.E. 4, 7(1903).
93. E.g., Leonardi v. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 56 N.E.2d 232(1944); Re the Maryland "prayers" see 13 MD. ST. BAR RE. 129 (1908).
94. Newcomer, Judicial Powers That Should Be Exercised, 12 A.B.A.S. 219
221 (1926). From some accounts of the Ohio frontier courts, the code precautions
might have been merited at one time. See II HIsTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO, OHIO
STATE ARCHEOLOGiCAL & HIsTORY SociEry 399 (1942). Thanks to Professor
C. F. Hyrne of the University of Toledo College of Law for verifying the fore-
going Ohio Summary.
95. GA. COD ANN. § 81-1101 (1937).
96. GA. COns ANN. § 81-1102 (1937). (Amended by Acts 1943 p. 262).
97. GA. CODs ANN. 1 81-1101 (1937).
98. I.e., in the sense of authorship at the outset, as in Tennessee (Group III
infra). The judicial duty as to the completeness of the charge is not especially
onerous in the absence of a request to charge by counsel; Wood v. Claxton, 199
Ga. 809, 35 S.E.2d 455 (1945).
99. GA. COns ANN. § 81-1104 (1937), is derived from this act and makes a
reversal mandatory when the trial judge has expressed or intimated an opinion.
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strike the trial judge mute.100 To it were added some of the "latest
improvements" between 1852 and 1861,101 and by 1868 one of the
supreme court judges candidly admitted:
Our experience on the circuit bench, makes us very sensible of
the difficulty of making charges unexceptionable and free from
violations of the Code, but we are persuaded it can be done by the
Judge avoiding the slightest reference to the testimony....lo2
And by 1895 that court was saying: "In the courts of this state,
juries, and not judges, sum up the evidence" 1 3-a statement which
(after having gone through the alembic of the practice books) prob-
ably "sums up" the question as to Georgia practice.10"
To stop here is to omit mention of cases containing some fine state-
ments of the judicial function,1 "5 and to leave out others which show
what a semanticist's paradise this field of investigation would be1O-
for it is extremely difficult to determine in what senses the terms
summary and sum up are being used.1 07 No discussion, however, could
show many cases revealing deliberate reviews of the evidence.108 Yet
even as to the cautious charges which the cases do exhibit, the Dumb
Act has been invoked most frequently. For instance, there are over
a hundred cases under it in the fifteen years between 1935 and 1950.101
The fifteen or so reversals may not be shocking in comparison to the
record in North Carolina, the state next to be discussed. Yet in the
technicality of the objections to instructions which they reveal (i.e.,
instructions "in the nature of comment," as the Missouri cases say)
these reversals argue powerfully that the Georgia judge would be on
most treacherous ground were he to venture beyond a bare statement
of the parties' theories and contentions.
100. "That Act [of Feb. 21, 1850) ... was called the Dumb Act, because(Justice] C.J. Bleckley said it struck the judges dumb." Richie, The Province of
the Judge in Juny Trials, 13 MD. ST. BAR REP. 129, 148 (1908).
101. The predecessors of the acts mentioned: GA. Coun ANN. § 81-1101 (1937)
dates back to 1853; § 81-1102 back to 1860; § 81-1103 back to 1860; § 81-1104
remains unchanged since 1850.
102. Whitley v. State, 38 Ga. 50, 74 (1868).
103. M cVicker v. Conkle, 96 Ga. 584, 597, 24 S.E. 23, 28 (1895).
104. CozART, GEORGIA PRACTICs RULEs, §§ 664 and 667 (3d ed. 1933).
105. Brown v. State, 6 Ga. App. 356, 360, 64 S.E. 1119, 1121 (1909).
106. See GA. Co - ANN. § 81-1104 (1937) under headings: Argumentative
charge, Assumption, Contentions, Facts, Issues, Law, Legal effect, Manner,
Reasons, Recapitulation, Reference, Reiteration, Repetition, Restatement, Sum-
ming up evidence, Undisputed facts and Whole charge.
107. E.g., Nelson v. State, 124 Ga. 8, 52 S.E. 20 (1905).
108. The 1951 cumulative pocket part to Book 23 of GA. CODE ANN. contains
22 pages of annotations of cases under § 81-1104. Yet the headings for Re-
capitulation, Restatement and Summary which appeared in the bound volume
have been dropped. The last case to repeat the talismanic phrase, "In the courts
of this state, juries, and not judges, sum up the evidence," was apparently Griffin
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 526, 530, 130 S.E. 368, 369 (1925).
109. This estimate is based on a count of annotations in GA. CODE ANN. §
81-1104 (Supp. 1951).
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North Carolina
This is the only state which has a mandatory summary of the
evidence."10 As the writers universally note, its statute, from which
the constitutions and codes of so many states were modeled, was
adopted in 1796, being the first in any state.", It has made a very
great deal of trouble, as the cases in almost any volume of the reports
attest." - Even in 1953 there was one opinion that observed:
Ordinarily the presiding judge must instruct the jury extem-
poraneously from such notes as he may have been able to prepare
during the trial .... 3
The opinion goes on to say that to require him to state every sentence
and clause with such nicety that it will stand inspection out of context
is an impossible burden. Another case last year reversed a criminal
conviction with a resounding reaffirmation of the mandatory duty
to charge on the contentions, evidence and the law.- 4
Since the situation in North Carolina is rather clear, and has been
discussed recently elsewhere,115 it may suffice here to point out that
the summary of the evidence now need go only ". . . to the extent
necessary to explain the application of the law thereto."'-8 Examina-
tion showed, however, that of thirty-seven cases appealed under
the summary-without-comment statute in a period of about three
years ending in the fall of 1953, twenty-four were remanded for new
trial." 7 Since the statute as interpreted seems to demand the impos-
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1953). Contra: VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note
9, at 229. But see Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, 36 IowA L.
R V. 436, 449 (1951).
111. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE oN EVIDENCE AT THE COMmON LAW 188
n.2 (1898); Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, 7 TENN. L. REV. 107
(1928). See AsHE, II HISTORY OF NoRTH CAROLINA 47-51 as to troubles leading
up to passage of the act of 1796, of which he says at 149, "... and further
curing some of the defects of administration, the judges were forbidden in charg-
ing the jury, to express an opinion. ... "
112. E.g., see General Statutes Construed § 1-180, 235 N.C. 873 (1952) (8
cases cited); General Statutes Construed § 1-180, 234 N.C. 859 (1951) (4 cases
cited); General Statutes Construed § 1-180, 233 N.C. 880 (1951) (7 cases cited);
General Statutes Construed 5 1-180, 232 N.C. 862 (1950) (7 cases cited). Of the
foregoing 26 cases, 17 were reversed for error in instructions-such error for the
most part going to the matter of propriety, sufficiency, etc., of the sunmmary.
113. Vincent v. Woody, 76 S.E.2d 356, 359 (N.C. 1953).
114. State v. Stroupe, 76 S.E.2d 313, 318 (N.C. 1953).
115. Wright, supra note 20, at 158-159.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. 4 1-180 (1953), as rewritten and amended in 1949
Session Laws c. 107. For a discussion of this act, see, A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina in 1949, 27 N.C.L. REV. 405, 435 (1948-1949) (excel-
lent discussion of this change doubtless written by Professor Herbert R. Baer of
the University of North Carolina School of Law).
117. This count is based on a series of cases commencing with Whiteheart v.
Grubbs, 232 N.C. 236, 60 S.E.2d 101 (1950), and ending with Blanton v. Carolina
Dairy, 238 N.C. 382, 77 S.E.2d 922 (1953), being simply the cases indexed under
General Statutes Construed f 1-180, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1953), and listed
in Vols. 232-238 of the North Carolina Reports.
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sible of the trial judge, the map shows North Carolina in half-and-half
fashion to indicate its ambivalence.118
GRouP III: DELAWARE, ALABAMA AND TENNESSEE
This stage of the discussion brings one to the states wherein oral
instructions are the general rule, where the charge in all cases follows
the closing arguments and is necessarily prepared for the most part
by the court. All forbid comment on the evidence; none forbid all
summarization of the evidence. The decisions of each display solici-
tude for the usefulness of the charge. Yet in none of them does the
trial charge deliberately go beyond a statement of the issues and the
contentions of the parties.
Delawa're
The Delaware constitution provides that "Judges shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions
of fact in issue and declare the law."'' 1  The retention of this provision
in the Delaware constitutional amendment of 1951 has recently been
noted as an indication that the restrictive movement in America
"had not fully expended its force in recent years."' 20 Delaware's ban
on comment is not new, however, for:
In the policy of law of this state, declared by the courts in
numberless decisions, the jury is the sole judge of the facts of a
case, and so jealous is the law of this policy that by express pro-
vision of the Constitution the court is forbidden to touch upon
the facts of the case in its charge to the jury.1 2 '
There are occasional cases which seem to assume that the charge
shall encompass a restatement of the evidence, 22 yet a well-informed
Delaware practitioner states that in fact the court confines itself to
stating the issues and the contentions of the parties' 2 This seeming
118. I.e., in the map which appears after the states in Group IV, infra, North
Carolina is certainly restricted and must therefore be shown bold ruled and dotted.
The judges, however, necessarily marshal the evidence, requiring a showing in
faint ruling. For those reasons it is shown half and half.
This North Carolina study was completed at the University of North Carolina
Law library in November of 1953. The courtesy of its faculty in letting the writer
have the run of that excellent library for an entire week is gratefully acknowl-
edged. Responsibility for the writer's dim view of N.C. Gu. STAT. § 1-180 (1953),
however, is his own.
119. Dmi. CONST. Art. 4, § 19.
120. MmLAR, op. cit. supra note 80, at 311. Professor Millar adds that:
This is seen in the adoption or reaffirmation of the restrictive rule by a
number of constitutions and statutes, exemplified by .. . its maintenance
in the Delaware constitutional amendment of 1951.
121. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. v. Gatta, 27 Del. (4 Boyce) 38,
56, 85 AtI. 721, 729 (1913).
122. Baker v. Reid, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 112, 124, 57 A.2d 103, 109 (1947) semble;
Buckley v. R. H. Johnson & Co., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 546, 25 A.2d 392 (1942).
123. Henry J. Ridgley, Esq., of Dover, Delaware. The fact that Delaware has
recently adopted the pattern of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
addition to superior court rules patterned after the federal civil rules, should
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contradiction is shown to be largely semantic upon close examination
of the cases. For instance, a 1942 case in the superior court 24 contains
a detailed account by an experienced judge as to the occurrences
during a trial at which he presided. It is seen that in three separate
instances he carefully indicated that he meant the term "charge upon
the facts" to be synonymous with "contentions of the parties." When
the jury asked for further instruction, for instance, he replied:
The Court instructed the jury that it should arrive at its verdict
based upon the preponderance of the evidence that it has heard,
and I cannot go further than that.... If I can charge you on any
further facts (contentions of the parties), or any further law,
I will be very glad to charge you.:2
That position seems to accord with the unique and specific language
of the Delaware constitution but results, of course, in something even
less than the "'mere colorless review" which some deprecate. It is
nevertheless noteworthy that relatively few cases seem to be appealed
on the ground of excesses in the trial charge.' -
Alabana
Alabama exhibits no departure from the mechanics common to this
group except that requested special instructions must be read ver-
batim if given, and may accordingly be refused for a typographical
error.14 The statute delimiting the charge is nevertheless unique:
The court may state to the jury the law of the case, and may
also state the evidence when the same is disputed, but shall not
charge upon the effect of the testimony, unless required to do so
by one of the parties.12s
The explanation of that choice of language is found in the Alabama
custom as to instructions in the nature of directed verdicts.1 29 It
carries over into the present subject to the extent that complaints as
to charges on the facts are usually based on the ground that they
amounted to something in the nature of direction.30 The term "gen-
eral charge" is taken in Alabama to refer to the directory charge, so
the court's charge must here be called the principal charge to avoid
be watched. It seems likely to the writer that the general objections to instruc-
tions, now tolerated, may be eliminated if the spirit of the federal rules is fol-
lowed. Cf. Long v. State, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 262, 273, 65 A.2d 489, 494 (1947).
124. Buckley v. R. H. Johnson & Co., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 546, 552, 25 A.2d 392,
394 (1942).
125. Id. at 552, 25 A.2d at 394.
126. A case by case examination of the Delaware Reports from vol. 41 to vol. 44(1940-50) revealed no square case on the matter of summary or comment.
127. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 273 (1940); Thomas v. State, 124 Ala. 48, 67, 27 So.
315, 320 (1900) ; Jarrell v. State, 35 Ala. App. 256, 262, 50 So.2d 767, 772 (1949);
Wilson v. State, 34 Ala. App. 219, 223, 39 So.2d 250, 254 (1948).
128. ALA. COD tit. 7, § 270 (1940) ; Hair v. Little, 28 Ala. 236 (1856).
129. Hon. J. R. McElroy, The General Affirmative Charge With Hypothesis in
Alabama, 1 ALA. L. REV. 151 (1949).
130. Rowe v. State, 243 Ala. 618, 623, 11 So.2d 749, 753 (1943); George v.
State, 240 Ala. 632, 638, 200 So. 602, 607 (1941).
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confusion. Those principal charges are oral in the full sense"13 and
are followed by the reading of the "given" special charges-which are
just as plethoric and technical as one finds anywhere. 32 Then follows,
at the court's discretion, an opportunity for the court to explain and
elucidate those special instructions-subject only to the requirement
that he shall not modify or alter them in the process.13
It is clear that the practice contemplates nothing more than presen-
tation of the issues and contentions of the parties in the principal
charge. Occasional statements that the court may review disputed
evidence must be taken with a grain of salt if one is thinking in terms
of the sort of review North Carolina requires,13 4 for as an 1896 case
says:
The numerous and oft recurring reversals of judgments, because
of instructions deemed to invade the province of the jury, mani-
fest the care and vigilance the court exercises .... 23
Vigilance against comment, which always makes summary hazard-
ous, is thus seen to be strict-although Rule 45, which appeared in
1913, has saved many cases where error in the giving or refusing of
instructions was merely technical and not prejudicial.G The calam-
ity of new trial is not seen so frequently in the past forty years-
since the adoption of that (harmless error in instructions) rule-but
one has no sure way of knowing whether credit is due to the rule or
to abandonment of the custom of summarizing.
Tennessee
The following provision of the Tennessee Constitution is clearly the
first appearance of the familiar pattern in American organic law:
Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact,
but may state the testimony and declare the law. 3'
This section has never been pressed in Tennessee to the extent to
131. E.g., Hair v. Little, 28 Ala. 236, 248 (1856) ; Coats v. State, 34 Ala. App.
577, 578, 42 So.2d 591, 592 (1949).
132. [O]f one hundred and seventy-five written charges, which were tendered
by the accused, the court gave eighty-four. ... The oral charge of the trial judge
[in addition] covers seventeen typewritten pages." Lovejoy v. State, 33 Ala. App.
414, 419, 34 So.2d 692, 696 (1948).
133. Under ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 273 (1940) (charges moved for by the parties),
it has long been so held. Callaway & Truitt v. Gay, 143 Ala. 524, 529, 39 So. 277,
279 (1905); Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322, 328 (1875); Bryer v. State, 34 Ala.
App. 561, 563, 42 So.2d 496, 498 (1949).
134. See the discussion of the North Carolina position supra.
135. Brown v. State, 109 Ala. 70, 79, 20 So. 103, 106 (1896).
136. ALA. CoDE tit. 7, Sup. Ct. Rule 45, p. 1022 (1940); Henderson v. Tennessee
Coal, Iron & Ry., 190 Ala. 126, 129, 67 So. 414, 415 (1914).
137. TENN. CONST. Art. 6, § 9 (1870) (same form as TENN. CONST. Art. 6,§ 5 (1796)). As to its adoption, see Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials,
12 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 76, 80 (1928) ; 14 MAss. L.Q. 48, 51 (1928) ; 7 TENN. L. Rov.
107, 115 (1929).
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which it has been enforced in the states which borrowed it.138 Early
cases lucidly expounded the merits of the impartial review which, they
said, the constitution was not designed to inhibit. At the same time,
it was admitted that ". .. the court in its discretion may decline
exercising the power given it, without committing error." 3",
Later cases, however, are more inclined to discuss the adequacy of
presentation of the issues than to refer to the process of refreshing the
jurors as to the evidence.1 0 Although not every remark in the pres-
ence of the jury is error simply because it bears a slight tinge of
comment, the increasing trend has been to hold the charge well within
the originally permitted limits.' An enlightening on-the-ground
report from Professor Forrest W. Lacey says:
All attorneys and the judge agreed that there was no custom of
giving a summary of the evidence as such. There is, however, a
custom of the judge giving the theories.... The judge was frank
to admit that in giving the theories of the respective parties...
there was a certain amount of summarizing of the evidence ....
The attorneys all agreed that the judges carefully refrained from
giving any comment, even in the giving of the theories of the
case, which probably accounts for the dearth of cases on the
problem. 142
The provisions for requests to charge are designed to insure that
the charge is prepared by the court.' 4' Requests may be written or
oral, may be submitted after the principal charge and (uniquely) need
not be heeded by the court if submitted prior thereto.' That is,
138. This language was borrowed from the 1796 statute of North Carolina
heretofore discussed in Group II, supra. Of the states in the present four groups,
only the following do not now have a similar provision in their constitutions or
statutes: Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Maryland.
139. Ivey v. Hodges, 23 Tenn. (4 Humph.) 154, 156 (1843).
Whereupon, the judge [Sir Matthew Hale himself] in giving his direction to
the jury, told them, that he would not repeat the evidence unto them, lest by
so doing he should wrong the evidence on the one side or on the other.
A Trial of Witches at St. Edmonds ?u 1665, 6 COBBLrT's STATE TRIALS 687 (London
ed. 1810).
140. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Anderson, 134 Tenn. 666, 681,
185 S.W. 677, 680 (1916) ; Tevis v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 21 Tenn.
App. 494, 503, 113 S.W.2d 64, 70 (1937). But cf. Earp v. Edgington, 107 Tenn.
23, 35, 64 S.W. 40, 43 (1901), where the charge was held diffuse and overlong
to the extent of confusing the issues.
141. Smartt v. State, 112 Tenn. 539, 552, 80 S.W. 586, 588 (1904) (reversible
error to remark in colloquy with counsel that an inference might be drawn from
certain testimony); Ayres v. Moulton & Reid, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 154 (1867;
Hughes v. State, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 75, 79 (1847) ; Tevis v. Proctor & Gamble
Distributing Co., 21 Tenn. App. 494, 503, 113 S.W.2d 64, 70 (1937) semble (Recent
cases on this point are rare).
142. Professor Lacey of the law faculty of the University of Tennessee, in
letter dated December 5, 1953, stated the consensus of informed local opinion.
143. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8809 and 8810 (Williams 1934) (civil); TENN. CoD-
ANN. 0 11749-11751 (Williams 1934) (criminal).
144. Chesapeake, Ohio & S.W. Ry. v. Foster, 88 Tenn. 671, 673, 13 S.W.
694 (1890) ; Roller v. Bachman, 73 Tenn. (5 Lea.) 153 (1880) ; Hemmer v. Ten-
nessee Electric Power Co., 24 Tenn. App. 42, 47, 139 S.W.2d 698, 701 (1940).
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requested instructions are designed to supply omissions in the court's
charge rather than to suggest what the charge shall be. Incidentally,
such charge in civil cases is almost always oral, despite a statutory
provision by which counsel may demand that the instructions be
reduced entirely to writing beforehand, 14r but the criminal charge
provision, making the written charge mandatory, is seldom success-
fully dispensed with even by stipulation of counsel. 4
Needless to say, the foregoing arrangement as to the presentation
of requests to charge puts a heavy burden on the court. One is told
that the Tennessee trial judge is sometimes submitted thirty or forty
typewritten pages of requests at the close of his main charge.1 47 The
consequent delay before the jury is sent out may stretch to three or
four hours. The circumstance that such requests had long been ready
to be presented quite understandably irks the court but is, of course,
completely consistent with the arrangement and order provided by
the statute.
GROUP IV: WISCONSIN, MINNESOTA, MARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS,
MAINE AND RHODE ISLAND
Since only two states of the six in this group are found actually to
belong in the Intermediate class, some differences in mechanics may
be expected. In all of them, the principal charges are oral, although
in varying degrees. In Wisconsin and Minnesota the requirement
that it be in writing is satisfied so long as the charge is taken down
by a reporter. Maryland charges are now permissively oral, whereas
in Massachusetts, Maine and Rhode Island it is required that they be
given in that offhand style.1 48 In Wisconsin, incidentally, the re-
quested written charges must be rendered verbatim. In all these
states the judge has the chief responsibility for preparing the charge
-although his duties with respect to sufficiency of the charge are
TE.NN. CODs ANN. § 8810 (Williams 1934) requires, however, that special requests
be in writing. Unless such are submitted after the conclusion of the general or
main charge, the judge cannot be put in error for refusal.
145. Professor Lacey, supra note 138, says:
It is not the custom to request the trial judge to reduce his charge to writing.
None of the attorneys remembered any case in which such a request had been
made, and the judge said it occurred only rarely....
146. TENx. CoDE ANN. § 11749 (Williams 1934). See the following cases
strongly disapproving waiver of written charge in criminal cases: Pedigo v. State,
191 Tenn. 691, 236 S.W.2d 89 (1951); and Adcock v. State, 191 Tenn. 687, 236
S.W.2d 88 (1949).
147. But Professor Lacey mentioned in this connection that some judges prevail
upon counsel to give the court a preview of the special instructions to be requested.
148.. "Offhand" is here used in the same sense as "free-style" was used in
discussion appearing in the introduction to Group I, n.42 sUpra. VANDEMILT, Op.
cit. supra note 9, at 233 cites these three states as ones requiring oral instructions.
That does not mean that the judge may not prepare his instructions beforehand,
f course-this is a matter of the style of delivery.
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rather minimal in Wisconsin. In all but Maryland the charge follows
closing arguments. With some possible exception as to criminal cases
in Wisconsin and Maryland, it is rather generally conceded that the
power to summarize exists in all. In addition, there is general (but
not unanimous) agreement that Rhode Island judges also have the
common law power of comment. Perhaps due inter alia to difficulties
of definition, there is no agreement among the writers as to whether
there is full-fledged power to summarize in the other states.
Wisconsin
Whatever powers (latent or patent) the Wisconsin judges may
have, it seems clear to the writer that they do not indulge in summary
as a matter of practice, that they probably could not comment in
criminal cases, and would be foolhardy to try it in civil causes.1 49
A Wisconsin report on compliance with the American Bar Associa-
tion's Minimum Trial Standards simply says that there is power to
summarize, but not to comment.'1 In 1927, a well-argued attempt
was made to convince a conference of circuit judges that they had
the common law powers, but for present purposes that address serves
best as an admission that those asserted powers were at least in
desuetude215
On the criminal side, there is no real bottom to the restrictions
which are asserted by way of dicta or mere rulings in the older
cases, -'5 but one doubts if those old holdings would readily be aban-
doned.1' On the civil side, the likelihood of clarification is slim, since
the use of special issues is highly developed and along lines which
149. The reasons for this opinion are to follow, but it is to be noted that
statutes on instructions do not forbid comment or a summary. Wis. STAT. §§ 270.21,
270.22, 270.23, 270.28 and 357.14 (1951).
150. 25 WIs. BAR BULLETIN 17, 19 (Oct. 1952). In a letter dated Sept. 25, 1953,
Professor Delmar Karlen of the New York University School of Law (formerly
of Wisconsin) wrote:
With respect to [these] questions, I have encountered the same difficulties.
.The cases in Wisconsin seem utterly contradictory.... I am certain
however, of the practice-which is that the trial judges do not exercise
whatever power they have. It is not customary to either summarize the
evidence, or to express an opinion on it.
151. Hoyt, The Judge's Power to Comment on the Testimony in His Charge to
the Jary, 11 MARQ. L. Rv. 67, 72 (1927).
152. See Dingman v. State, 48 Wis. 485, 491, 4 N.W. 668, 672 (1880), which
cites early civil cases and says of one: "The same case ... holds that in criminal
cases the rule is more stringent, and that in such cases it is error to express any
opinion... ." (Italics added.); Horr v. C.W. Howard Co., 126 Wis. 160, 164-166,
105 N.W. 668, 670-671 (1905).
153. See Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 191, 231 N.W. 634, 637 (1930), where
it is said:
It is not to be denied that many courts of this country do not tolerate any
expression of opinion on the part of the trial judge.... Such is the tend-
ency of this court. [Collecting cases.]
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discourage the use of any more general instruction than is absolutely
necessary.'5
There were two decisions in the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
early 1930's indicating friendliness toward the common law judicial
function, but neither decision is square on the point.15 5 There is incli-
nation among the writers to place Wisconsin toward the Unrestricted
side.25  A well-informed Wisconsin observer noted, however, that
"The cases ... seem utterly contradictory."" 7 Review of those cases
seems purposeless here, in view of the discrepancy between the present
practice and theory. So long as the supreme court asserts existence
of the common law power, however, it would be improper to show
this state-for the present purposes-otherwise than Intermediate
on the map."8s
Minnesota
Apart from North Carolina, this is the first state of any of the
groups so far discussed, in which the review of the evidence is actually
practiced. Although Minnesota has recently adopted the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, that fact made no especial change in the mechanics
of the charge."' That Minnesota system was described in this Quar-
terly several years ago by the learned Judge Royal A. Stone of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota.26' He pointed out that there the judge
is largely "on his own" in preparing the charge. As to the requested
instructions on the law, it is not reversible error to give them as the
instuctions of one or the other of the parties, but the supreme court
feels strongly that there is great loss of force and prestige if the law
is not stated in the form of a statement sponsored and adopted as
the court's own. The judge must assume responsibility for the charge,
for:
A judge's habitual dependence upon counsel for the whole or
even much of his instructions, will not stimulate his juridical
metabolism.161
154. Byington v. City of Merrill, 112 Wis. 211, 226-229, 88 N.W. 26, 31-32
(1901). See REID BRANSoN INSTRUCTION TO JURIES iii (3d ed. 1936), which
says that ". . . [I]n some states, notably Wisconsin, the use [of special verdicts)
is almost universal in civil cases.;
155. See Branigan v. State, 209 Wis. 249, 255-257, 244 N.W. 767, 770 (1932);
Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
156. WILLAR, op. cit. supra note 80, at 312; VANDERBILT, op cit. supra note 9,
at 227, 228.
157. Note 150 supra.
158. Thus one avoids denial of the language of cases which says it is commend-
able for the judge to summarize if he has the courage, e.g., Horr v. C.W. Howard
Co., 126 Wis. 160, 165-166, 105 N.W. 668, 670-671 (1905).
159. Complete rule making power was entrusted to the supreme court (as to
civil procedure) in 1947, Laws 1947, c. 498 § 1. MINN. RuuEs oF Cir. PRoc. for the
district courts took effect Jan. 1, 1952. As to the opinion that no especial change
was brought about, see the letter of Professor Louisell cited in text at note 170
infra.
160. Stone, supra note 25.
161. Id. at 464.
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The jurisdiction is Common Law in the sense that there is no law
inhibiting summing-up, although there is a provision found on the
criminal side only which might be taken to imply that instructions
concerning facts in criminal trials are to be held within closer bounds
than are those in civil causes.162 On either side, incidentally, it is suffi-
cient that the charge be written in the form of the reporter's pothooks
awaiting transcription in the event of an appeal.163
The summary power in this state is seldom questioned-the really
debatable point is to what extent it may go farther.16 4 A detailed
attempt to supply the answer appeared in a law review note of some
twenty years ago, which dissected many Minnesota cases turning on
challenged judicial remarks and summations. 6 5 After having aligned
them under their ostensible categorizations- error in "singling-
out,""- argumentativeness2 7 undue stress and the like16 -its author
was dismayed to find the line between the taboo and the permissible
to be discouragingly indefinite. It is submitted, however, that one
may encounter the same frustration if he seek to classify the very
numerous federal cases involving those same varieties and variations
of unfair comment.",--, The likelihood that certain charges, disap-
proved in Minnesota, would have passed muster in many federal
circuits, however, is not strictly relevant to the present topic. On the
other hand, the following statement of Professor David W. LouiselP
70
goes right to the nub and center of the present business:
Our Supreme Court encourages the trial courts in their charges
to summarize the evidence-to marshal the facts-but only toler-
ates the expression of an opinion by the court as to the credibility
of any witness. When the judge expresses an opinion, the opinion
will be scrutinized carefully to make sure it is fair. 71
162. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.08 (1947) in substance says that if the court pre-
sents the facts, it shall inform the jury that it is the exclusive judge thereof.
163. Stone, s.pra note 25, at 461. This explains why reported instructions are
duly "written."
164. Earlier 48-state surveys had placed Minnesota with the Common Law
states, but VANDERBILT, Op. cit. sup'ra note 9, at 227 showed it as Intermediate;
and MILLAR, op. cit. supra note 80, at 310-311, n.118, says:
[Ilt is not altogether clear that Minnesota can be regarded as squarely
falling within this (unrestricted] group: see Pressley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & Southern Ry., 130 Minn. 121, 153 N.W. 115 (1915)....
165. Note, 18 MINN. L. Rsv. 441 (1934), analyzing scores of Minnesota cases.
166. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 251, 114 N.W. 763, 765 (1908).
167. State v. Dallas, 145 Minn. 92, 176 N.W. 491 (1920).
168. Harriott v. Holmes, 77 Minn. 245. 79 N.W. 1003 (1899).
169. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); 9 WIGMoRM, EVIBNCE S
2551 (3d ed. 1940); Weissberger, The Right of the Trial Judge in FederaZ Courts
to Comment on the Evidence, 5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 272 (1936); Note, 95 A.L.R.
785 (1935); Note 18 MINN. L. REV. 441, 433-450 (1934).
170. Professor David W. Louisell, member of the law faculty at the University
of Minnesota.
171. In a letter to the writer dated September 11, 1953 and citing the following
cases: State v. Hansen, 173 Minn. 158, 217 N.W. 146 (1927); King Cattle Co.
v. Joesph, 165 Minn. 28, 205 N.W. 639 (1925) ; Bonness v. Felsing, 97 Minn. 227,
106 N.W. 909 (1906).
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Maryland
A rather plausible argument may be made that the written instruc-
tions system originated in provincial Maryland a century and a half
before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. 72 At
any rate, it is quite clear that the system of written prayers came to
fine flower in the corresponding period ending in 1941.113 But in the
latter year, Maryland scrapped that plan entirely, and took the Massa-
chusetts system as its model." 4 The 1941 rule retained little of the
old charging procedure except its ancient order of instructing before
final arguments. It is noticeable, however, that the language of the
pertinent Trial Rule is not too stringently specific:
[T] he Court... may sum up the evidence, if it instructs the jury
that they are to determine for themselves the weight of the
evidence and the credit to be given to the witnesses.
An oral charge need not comply with the technical rules as to
prayers. 7 5
Taking "'sum up" in its American connotation, Maryland would be
in the Intermediate class-but on the contrary, it seems that the
words are being given their historic meaning, and this state is there-
fore shown unrestricted on the map.170 The rule has had nine inter-
pretations in appealed civil judgments, and in each case the charge
has been approved -and the language of the opinions has tended
toward allowance of considerable latitude.177 On the criminal side,
however, there are really no precedents either way-since criminal
juries have, at least until very recently, judged both fact and law
under the Maryland Constitution. 78
172. See Maryland Provincial Act of 1642, 1 ARCHIVES OF MD. 151, 187; How-
ard, The Exclusive Use of Written Prayers and Instructions in Civil Cases in
Maryland, 31 MD. ST. BAR REP. 120, 133 (1926).
173. A prayer is a request in writing by counsel to the Court to declare to
the jury the law applicable to the facts of the case. When granted, the
prayer becomes the court's instruction .... Except in exceptional cases,
the Court does not even read to the jury the prayers it grants.
Ritchie, The Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, 13 MD. ST. BAR REPI. 129(1908). See also, Maryland Steel Co. v. Engleman, 101 Md. 661, 679, 61 Atl.
314, 315 (1905).
174. Soper, The Charge to the Jury in Maryland under the New Rules of
Practice and Procedure, 6 MD. L. REV. 35 (1941) (collecting Massachusetts cases
at 40, 41).
175. MD. ANN. CoDn Gaw. LAWS, General Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Rule 6(b) (2) (1951).
176. See especially, as to scope given the phrase "sum up," Snyder v. Cearfoss,
190 Md. 151, 161, 57 A.2d 786 (1947).
177. This series includes cases on various aspects of instructions, being inter-
pretations of the entire Rule 6 as to instructions. It commences with Feinglos v.
Weiner, 181 Md. 38, 44, 28 A.2d 577, 580 (1942), includes Synder v. Cearfoss,
supra note 176, and ends with Victor Lynn Lines v. State, 199 Md. 468, 478,
87 A.2d 165, 171 (1952). Wright, supra note 20, at 150, n.76.
178. Henderson, The Jury as Judges of Fact and Law in Md., 52 MD. ST. BAR
REP. 186-188 (1947), giving the history of Article 25, § 5 of the Maryland Con-
stitution. But see Criminal Procedural Reform Achieved in Maryland, 11 MD.
L. REv. 319 (1951).
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Massachusetts
The classic oral charge, with all its repetition and emphasis, is
found amply illustrated here.- 9 This commonwealth has not been a
Common Law jurisdiction, strictly speaking, since a statute (borrow-
ing the language seen in the Tennessee Constitution)11° was in 1860
bulled through the state house in midnight fashion by the aggressive
General Ben Butler."1 That act was in derogation of the common
law as it had been accepted and adapted in Massachusetts, however,
and accordingly has always been held down to the barest essence of
its wording." One of its early interpretations said:
But a judge may "state the testimony"; and this can hardly be
done without calling the attention of the jury to the weight and
importance to be attached to particular facts .... To assist and
guide the deliberations of the jury by such comments is no in-
fringement upon their province, but often is a duty necessary
to lead their minds to an enlightened and discriminating consider-
ation of the case.183
Since the last-mentioned statement is probably still "law" in Massa-
chusetts, one might wonder if it is necessary to go further. It is well
to do so, however, to demonstrate the extent to which state compari-
sons are relative matters-and to show that judgments as to a state's
liberality rest largely in opinion. For instance, there was considerable
feeling in Massachusetts in 1928 that its trial judges were unduly
hampered. This was illustrated by a newspaper symposium on the
subject of the restoration of common law judicial powers.184 In the
same direction, the late Dean Wigmore, in speaking of the summary
without comment system, referred to a 1932 Massachusetts case as
a "good example of the application of this weak-hearted compromise
rule."1,
On the other hand, an articulate advocate of the federal system of
charging, when introducing the new Maryland rule to the bar of that
state, cited and discussed the Massachusetts cases as models of the
tolerant interpretation for which the sponsors of the new rule
hoped."
Supporting the position that Massachusetts is unrestricted is its
179. Whitney v. Wellesley & Boston St. Ry., 197 Mass. 495, 496-501 (1908) (84
N.E. 95 is same case, but charge not set out). See VANEas1LT, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 233.
180. See text at note 137 supra.
181. MAss. GEx. LAws c. 231, § 81 (1932). See Hale, History of the Statute
Forbidding Judges to Charge upon the Facts, 11 MAss. L.Q. 57 (1926).
182. See Hogan, The Strangled Judge, 22 VT. ST. BAR AssN. 13 (1929), 14J. AM. Jup. Soc'Y 116 (1930) (abbreviated reprint).
183. Durant %. Burt, 98 Mass. 161, 168 (1867).
184. Should a Judge Charging a Jury be Allowed to Comment on the Evidence?
Boston Traveler, Oct. 1, 1928; 14 MASs. L.Q. 44 (1928) (reprint).
185. 9 WIGMORE, EvDENcE § 2551 n.3 (3d ed. 1940), referring to Holunan v.
Hemmen, 280 Mass. 526, 182 N.E. 850 (1932).
186. Soper, supra note 174, at 40-41 (1941).
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concession that the judicial discretion as to the summary includes the
important power to refrain altogether from touching on the facts
when the court deems fit' 87-as did the federal trial court in the
Alger Hiss trial. 18 s Furthermore, when a summary seems to have
gone somewhat over the line, or when it appears that the trial court
must have temporarily lost its judicial poise, there is not necessarily
a reversal. The reviewing court may say:
We think it would have been better if the expressions had been
more guarded, but when we consider the instructions as a whole
... we are of opinion that no intentional argument or expression
of opinion appears, and that there is no such error as wouldjustify us in disturbing the verdict 1 8
Maine
Prior to its 1874 statute,190 the Maine cases had established the
common law summing up approximately within the usual American
limits. 91 Although its statute was more elaborate in terms than that
of Massachusetts, 9 2 it met with the same cool reception accorded its
counterpart in the Bay State. 93
The courts recognized that summarization under the statutory re-
striction was a task of delicacy, but felt that the judge was accord-
ingly entitled to exercise some discretion as to its limits.19' Judicial
interpretations seemed in time to overshadow the written law.'",
187. R. Dunkel, Inc. v. V. Barletta Co., 302 Mass. 7, 18 N.E.2d 377 (1938)(collecting cases). Note also in this connection the language of Sir Matthew Hale
quoted in note 139 supra.
188. United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1950).
See McColloch, The Earl Jowitt on the Hiss Case, 40 A.B.A.3. 199, 201 (March,
1954).
189. Cook v. Bartlett, 179 Mass. 576, 580, 61 N.E. 266, 267 (1901) (charge set
out at 179 Mass. at 578). In that case, the plaintiff sought recovery for loss
of services of an adopted daughter by reason of her alleged seduction. The
charge said that the jury might consider the likelihood of parents bringing the
daughter here to testify falsely merely for money ". . . to her own disgrace,...
perhaps not exactly selling the girl, but selling all they could ever take any pride
in, in the child."
190. ME. REV. STAT. c. 212 (1874). The present form, ME. REv. STAT. c. 212,
§ 105 (1944), remains substantially unchanged.
191. Hayden v. Bartlett, 35 Me. 203, 204 (1853); Dyer v. Greene, 23 Me. 464,
470 (1844) ; Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 29, 42 (1831).
192. Mu. RE. STAT. c. 212, § 105 (1944), provides that:
During a jury trial, the presiding justice . . . shall not during the trial,
including the charge, express an opinion upon issues of ?act arising in the
case....
193. The process of putting this statute in its place commenced with State v.
Benner, 64 Me. 267, 291 (1874), and Grows v. Main Central R.R., 69 Me. 412,
416 (1879).
194. Jameson v. Weld, 93 Me. 345, 357, 45 Atl. 299, 304 (1899) ; York v. Maine
Central R.R., 84 Me. 117, 128, 24 AtI. 790, 79S (1891); Murchie v. Gates, 78
Me. 300, 306, 4 AtI. 698, 701 (1886) ; Virgie v. Stetson, 73 Me. 452, 464 (1882).
195. State v. Mathews, 115 Me. 84, 86, 97 At]. 824 (1916) ; State v. Day, 79
Me. 120, 125. 8 Atl. 544, 546 (1887). In State v. Mathews at 115, 97 Atl. at 825,
the charge displays considerable sarcasm by the trial court in its discussion of a
defense that the illegal "old cider" was in reality merely three gallons of vinegar
that the defendant was going to sweeten and drink "with soda."
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Simple inadvertences and slips of the judge were excused.196 "Mere
truisms" and "observations as to matters of experience" were held
permissible in a case where the court remarked that defendant had
testified to borrowing the property in question for five or six years
which (the judge added) "is a long time to borrow things in ordinary
communities."1117 A later case saltily said:
If the respondent felt that the justice in his charge "spoke
daggers," the record discloses that there were no "daggers"
used2"
It had been decided at the outset that the statute simply meant that
the judge should refrain from speaking of the facts in a manner
implying his utterances to be entitled to obedience.' 9' That position
may have been tempered since,2(-° but not to an extent such as to raise
any real doubt that Maine belongs to the White group.201
Rhode Island
Since the respected Judge Otis of Missouri once suggested that
Rhode Island is Intermediate, it is mentioned herein as a postscript
to Group IV. - °  It is now at least clear that the unrestricted charge
is often used by its trial justices, but whether the supreme court is
seeking to curtail that freedom must be considered.
Several historical factors make the common law charge something
less than a direct heritage, in unbroken line, from the early days of
these plantations.2-°3 Instructions cases are seen as early as 1858,
however.2- 4 Although the relative powers of court and jury were
clarified substantially in 1902,2 Q there had meanwhile been enacted
a statute giving the judge great latitude in his comments on the
evidence.20- Presently one notices that in the nine months ending in
196. Grows v. Maine Central R.R., 69 Me. 412 (1879).
197. McLellan v. Wheeler, 70 Me. 285, 286 (1879).
198. State v. Mann, 143 Me. 305, 307, 61 A.2d 786, 788 (1948).
199. State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267, 291 (1874). See Allard v. La Plain, 125 Me.
44, 46, 130 Atl. 737, 739 (1925).
200. Desmond v. Wilson, 143 Me. 262, 267, 60 A.2d 782, 785 (1948).
201. State v. Jones and Howland, 137 Me. 137, 140-142, 16 A.2d 103, 105(1940) ; Benner v. Benner, 120 Me. 468, 469, 115 Atl. 202 (1921).
202. Otis, sz(pra note 26, at 57.
203. See CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PRoVIDNCE
PLANTATIONS Art. X, §i 3 (1843) (expressly annulled by Article of Amendment,
Art. XII (1903)). As to history of constitution, see Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I.
1, 12, 186 At. 832, 839 (1936).
204. State v. Lynott, 5 R.I. 295 (1858).
205. Opinion to the Senate, 24 R.I. 625, 58 Atl. 51 (1902). The Judges of
Rhode Island in the opinion answered in the affirmative the question: "Has the
General Assembly the power to establish inferior courts, and to authorize thejudges thereof, not being judges of the Supreme Court, to preside at jury trials
and instruct the jury?"
206. State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 269, 58 Atl. 905, 907 (1904), which con-
strued R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 223, § 13 (1896). The latter is now R.I. GEN. LAWS
c. 496, A 20 (1938). For a flagrant abuse of this latitude see the charge held
improper in Pompei v Cassetta, 63 R.I. 74, 77, 7 A.2d 198, 200 (1939): "No
matter who gets this woman . . . he does not get any prize package ....
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March of 1953, three cases were appealed on the grounds that the
charges had been unfair-and in all three there was reversal and
remand.207
In two of them, the court simply failed to give the jury a fair
picture of the respective positions of the parties in the light of their
contentions and supporting evidence.20 8 The third showed a charge
wherein the judge recounted his observations in very "folksy" fashion
indeed.20 9 Because he drew unduly on his personal notions and extra-
judicial experience, to the derogation of expert witness testimony, a
clear example of unfair comment was presented.
Percentagewise, the trial justices are seen to have had a bad winter
season in Rhode Island in 195253.210 That score nevertheless need
not evidence a campaign to hold down the superior courts. It may
rather be taken to demonstrate that, even in a Common Law state,
the reviewing courts will not hesitate to scrutinize the trial charge for
unfairness, nor to strike down any verdict that might reflect an inac-
curate, inept, or partisan charge.211
CONCLUSION
Recapitulation
The unrestricted category is now finally taken here as including
the following thirteen: California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Miahigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Me~ico,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont.
The Intermediate group has dwindled to a thin grey line of five
plus the unappraisable North Carolina-a round figure total of six.
Of that half dozen, Alabama and Tennessee use no more than state-
ments of theories and contentions. Utah and Wisconsin courts have
no substantial review of the evidence whatsoever. The mandatory
summary of North Carolina has proved to be a trap not only for the
litigant but also for the harassed trial judge. Only in Minnesota is
there any real use of review-and its judges have a supervised com-
ment power for a margin of safety. But the comment power is
207. McCreadie v. Biltcliffe, 95 A.2d 458 (R.I. 1953); Miller v. Bessette, 94
A.2d 253 (R.I. 1953); W.C. Viall Dairy v. Providence Journal Co., 89 A.2d 839
(R.I. 1952).
208. McCreadie v. Biltcliffe, 95 A.2d 458, 459 (R.I. 1953); Miller v. Bessette,
94 A.2d 253, 255 (R.I. 1953).
209. W.C. Viall Dairy v. Providence Journal Co., 89 A.2d 839, 841 (R.I. 1952).
210. To wit: 0.000 as to this random series of cases. But in no one of the fore-
going did the supreme court deny the power of the judge to make fair summation.
211. The average of affirmances as to challenged summations in the federal
courts is high, of course. Otis, supra note 26, at 25-27. But even under that very
liberal federal system, a reversal on these grounds is no novelty. See those cases
at 9 WIGMORE, EvmnNcs. § 2551 n.6,7 (3d ed. 1940), which include rebukes to the
United States district judges, which Dean Wigmore attributes to the baneful effect
of the opinion in Querica v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
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supposed always to be exercised subject to supervision and scrutiny
in this country, and to be primarily useful only as a reserve of
power.21 2 Thus only the fact that the permissible limits on comment
in Minnesota are unclear justifies its exclusion from the minority
(White) -group.
The remaining eight of the assertedly Intermediate states have been
placed, on the accompanying map, in the (bold-ruled-and-dotted)
areas of those "restricted in fact," for the reasons already stated in
the individual discussions. But the particular point at which the line is
drawn between these and the (faint-ruled) Intermediate states is by
no means considered vital. It has simply seemed that the restriction
of the recently reaffirmed Delaware constitutional article213 has just
enough firmness to warrant placing Delaware behind the line which
separates the more restricted from the less restricted. The reader's
own sources of information may lead him to move the line in one
direction or the other. Based on drawing the line there, however, it
appears that the following are actually restricted as to the review and
restatement of the. evidence: Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas.
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio and Wyoming. Adding these to the twenty-
one concededly restrictive states makes a total of some twenty-nine
wherein no review of the evidence is permissible, or at least prac-
ticable. Then as to the previously discussed remainder of nineteen
(six Intermediate and thirteen Unrestricted), it may safely be said
that only in the White group of thirteen, plus North Carolina and
Minnesota, is such practice in existence to any perceptible extent. The
conclusion follows that the "clear but perfectly colorless presentation
of the evidence" which the English writer decried is not a hardy
species which thrives on confinement. Given rules which are designed
to hold the charge exactly within the limits of the summary-without-
comment specifications, the truncated summing up shrinks to some-
thing less than a review although, happily, seldom to the point of a
mere reading of the pleadings.214
Postlude
The two main schools of thought as to the judicial function are so
far apart, as Judge Clark once suggested, that it is hard to find a
basis for impartial discussion of their respective merits.216 It is
perhaps for that reason that virtually no objective discussion of the
212. Otis, supra note 26, at 15, 47 et seq.
213. DEL. CONST. Art. 4, § 19.
214. Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo. 233, 249, 88 Pac. 221, 224 (1907); of. Nash-
ville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Anderson, 134 Tenn. 666, 185 S.W. 677
(1915).
215. Clark, supra note 21.
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present problem is found 16  Yet theoretically it might seem that
common ground could be reached.
The impasse is seen to center at the flammable topic of "comment"
-the very subject which this paper sought to avoid. Yet the use of
the comment power, where it is permitted in the American system,
is always subject to review-and such is the situation in the British
Dominions, for that matter.2 17 The strongest advocates of the federal
or common law powers, furthermore, are the most vehement in their
assertions, sometimes documented, that the comment prerogative is
most rarely used.2 12
The majority argument, on the other hand, is inspired by-and is
built around-abhorrence of that comment power.21 9 But it is seldom
heard that there is anything undesirable about an impartial recapitu-
lation of the evidence.
The law has always favored peaceful adjustment of seemingly
irreconcilable contentions. Thus for the minority to give up the
seldom-used residual power of comment, and for the majority to
make the sacrifice of conceding a right to give an uncolored restate-
ment of what has gone on at trial, would seem to make for a sensible
settlement. As the discussion has shown, however, the brute fact is
that this compromise has been tried since 1796, and has always failed.
The compromise systems inevitably shrink into the custom of
merely stating the pleadings, issues or contentions, or they expand
into something substantially indistinguishable from the minority sys-
tem. The unfairness of simply blaming the trial judiciary for the
failure of these attempted compromises is attested by numerous cases
in which reviewing courts admit the utter temerity of any charge
which attempts comprehensive summary within the limits of a strict
no-comment rule.226 And even a cynic could hardly deny that a trial
judge has an almost fiduciary duty to avoid inviting technical appeals.
Something more than a judge's selfish concern for his personal percen-
216. Enough of this literature has been cited herein passim to show that
summary and comment is, to the contrary, usually treated as a fighting issue.
217. The most readily accessible collection of Dominion cases is in 9 WIGMORE,
EViENCE § 2551 n.4 (3d ed. 1940). But in England, criminal appeal was not
achieved until 1907 (KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL, LAW, 492, 496 (15th ed.
1936)), and in Scotland, not until 1926. See Trial of Oscar Slater, Appendix X,
in NOTABLE ENGLISH TRIALS SiEams (4th ed. 1950).
218. VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 225.
219. Illustrations collected in the original version of Hogan, The Strangled
Judge, 22 VT. ST. BAI ASS'N. 13, 19 (1929), and see Levenson, ComTent to the
.Jiury by the Trial Judge, A Reply, 21 ORE. L. REv. 168 (1942).
220. "When a trial judge has both the industry and the courage to undertake
to so promote the cause of justice, we are far from suggesting criticism or dis-
approval." Horr v. C.W. Howard Paper Co., 126 Wis. 160, 165, 105 N.W. 668, 671(1906). See also the quotation from Whitley v. State, 38 Ga. 60, 74 (1868) in
the Georgia discussion in Group II, supra note 102.
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tage of sustained judgments thus discourages use of the intermediate
power on his part.
Despite agitation for improvement, this deadlock remains. 221 The
reform argument, invoking a sort of postliminium, says in effect:
scrap the restrictions and there will be an automatic revival of the
traditional powers of the trial judge, since they were of the essence
of jury trial as at common law. The other side sits grimly tight or
devises new legislative restrictions.2" From this cu de sac there
seems no easy escape, nor is it the proper function of a survey like
this to try to locate the exit. Such attempt would at best be a brash
one, since the province of the judge and the jury was not a new
problem when BsheW-' Case was decided almost three centuries
ago.223 Few solutions could be advanced that are not already to be
found in the vast literature on this subject.224
It is at least clear that the extent to which the courts of the several
states permit a summary of the evidence is a relative matter, and one
which is difficult to "peg" in specific categories. The controlling ele-
ment is not necessarily a prohibition of such review, since most of
the states herein discussed ostensibly permit it. Often some require-
ment such as strict insistence upon written-and-read instructions is
the one which makes recapitulation of the evidence a mere matter of
,theory rather than practice.
When one looks at the general instructions phase of the charging
process in isolation, as has been done here, it is at least superficially
puzzling to find that requirements as to the mechanics of the charge
are permitted to impinge upon the function which the instructions
are expected to perform; the classic definition of the charge to the
jury comprises statement of the issues, and the contentions of the
parties with respect thereto, discussion of what the contestants have
done by way of introduction of testimony and other evidence to sup-
port those contentions, and the laying down of the applicable rules
of law. 23 Yet most states have modified that definition, and the
writers on procedural reform, almost to a man, refuse to stomach
those restrictions. Their objections take many forms, but probably
have one common denominator-a rejection of one tacit assumption
221. Kolknan v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931); People v. Kelly, 347
Ill. 221, 179 N.E. 893 (1932).
222. Brand, A Threat to the Federal Judiciary, 35 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 164(1952).
223. Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), discussed
in Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L. REv.
555 (1950).
224. Chesnut, Instructions to the Jury, Judicial Administration Monographs,
Series A, #6, 3 F.D.R. 113 (1942) (reprint); 1 RANDALL, INSTRUcTONS TO
JURIS iii (1922).
. 225. FiELD AND KAPL&N, MATERALS FOR A BASTC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
101 (1953).
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of the modified systems. That is, they deny the latter's basic postulate,
which is that some workable system can be devised to take the place
of judicial discretion as to the method of performing this judicial
duty. Adhering to a common law concept, they insist that almost by
definition of the term court of record there can be no substitute for
the judicial discretion of such court. Common to most of their criti-
cisms are the compelling arguments to be made from the history of
the manner in which the limitations arose. Times have now changed,
they point out, and the reasons for the restrictive rules have dis-
appeared.
Still looking only at the trial judge's power to recapitulate the
evidence, it appears that the foregoing arguments have not brought
about very much change in the past quarter century. This "glacial
progress" is noteworthy only by comparison to the force and author-
ity behind the concerted effort for reform as exemplified by the
promulgation of the American Bar Association's Minimum Standards
of Trial Practice. It is believed, however, that the movement cannot
be accurately appraised by looking at this single element of the charge
in isolation. One must seek further, picture the instructing process
as a whole, and view it broadly as a joint function of the court and
the parties. Regulation of the system of instructing must be seen for
what it is, a matter of the division of duties and responsibility between
judge and counsel. At common law, the power of the court was great,
but so was the responsibility of the advocates for the parties. If
counsel were to be in position to complain of errors or omissions in
the charge, it was essential that they had called such alleged mistakes
or inadequacies to the attention of the court in time to have given it
opportunity to have made such corrections. 221
The trend of the nineteenth century pattern of state court restric-
tions was clearly toward reduction of the judicial power, and also-
in many instances-toward a lessening of the common law responsi-
bility of counsel. Delaware, for example, first restricted the scope of
the charge by constitution, as seen in the earlier discussion (Group
III). Thereafter a practice developed, admittedly in the teeth of that
common law tradition, whereby a general objection to the charge
sufficed to preserve many grounds of error with respect thereto. 22
Quite recently, however, Delaware adopted trial rules modeled after
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Rule 51 of which codifies the
common law responsibility of counsel.228 And in states scattered all
226. See Buckley v. Johnson & Co., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 546 (1942), holding that
the common law rules as stated in 2 CiTrry, GENERAL PRACTInE 913, and 2 TmDo,
PRACTIC 934 (1856), had been modified by Delaware common law.
227. Buckley v. Johnson & Co., supra note 226.
228. Dum. Coim ANN., Rules of the Superior Court (civil), Rule 51, p. 411(Adopted July 1, 1947). Federal Rule 51 is found in 28 U.S.C.A., Rules; and see
Chesnut, Instructions to the Jury, 3 F.D.R. 113, 117 (1944).
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over the country there are such mutations in varying degrees. Seem-
ingly regardless of the pre-existent system of instructing, the federal
rules of procedure are being adopted by state after state, and Rule 51
with them.229 It is believed that the next step in evaluating attempts
to improve the charge to the jury must consider the effect of this
trend toward regulation of procedure by such rules. It is possible
that a changed balance of responsibility between court and counsel
is emerging.230 All would admit that there is a difference between
"muzzling" a judge by forbidding him to summarize or comment on
the evidence, on the one hand, and an insistence, on the other hand,
that his instructions be models of perfection quite regardless of
whether counsel requested correct or incorrect instructions-and re-
gardless of whether they made other than a dragnet objection before
the jury retired. It seems obvious that it is less disastrous to justice
to forbid any sort of summing-up than to give counsel open season,
as someone said, to hunt for error in the charge at his convenience
after verdict. When the change in the American pattern that is being
brought about through the model of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is evaluated, it may well be found that considerable progress
toward improvement of the instructing stage of trial practice is being
made by what is sometimes called the "flanking attack."
Completing the circle, however, and returning to the power to
undertake the difficult and somewhat thankless task of clarifying the
facts for the jury, there is not much indication that the reform move-
ment's "frontal attack" has made itself widely felt. In many state
courts the bench is not permitted to make much reference to the facts,
and in more the judges have found it indiscreet to volunteer (regard-
less of theoretical powers) much of what Judge Soper called the
sorting out of tangled skeins of controversy.231 In this connection,
these somewhat plaintive words from a Delaware charge seem ap-
posite:
The Court are not allowed to comment on the testimony, and it
is of such character that we shall not undertake to review it,
because it might seem like commenting. We hope, therefore, that
the jury will be able to remember and understand the testimony
with sufficient clearness to determine whether the note sued on
was a promissory note....
229. See MILLAR, op. cit. supra note 80, at 62 for a prediction that they will
eventually become the pattern of state procedure of the entire country.
230. The third article of this series on Instructions (the present paper being
the second) will consider the so-called Duty to Charge in the light of the respective
responsibilities of court and counsel.
231. Soper, The Charge to the Jury, 1 F.R.D. 540, 24 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y iii
(1940).
232. Gibson v. Gillespie, 34 Del. (4 W.W. Harr.) 331-344, 152 Atl. 589, 595
(1928).
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